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# 1

## Introduction

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That the Soviet Union had an official ideology known as Marxism – Leninism is generally agreed. That tells us something, but it also begs a lot of questions. Marxism–Leninism was obviously a posthumous term. Marx could not have used it and it never entered Lenin’s head to do so. It was after Stalin had succeeded to the leadership of the Soviet Union that the term was introduced. As a concept, ‘Marxism–Leninism’ is also somewhat ambiguous. Does it, or *did* it, mean the sum total of the works of Marx and Lenin or should it, rather, be considered as the conscious selection from the works of the intellectual forefather and the father of the Soviet system made by subsequent Soviet leaders (or, more broadly, by the political elite)?

In reality Soviet Marxism–Leninism was both more and less than the sum of all the works of Marx and Lenin. It was *more* not only in the sense that subsequent politically authoritative interpreters added to (or ‘creatively developed’, as the Soviet phrase had it) the arguments of Marx and Lenin but also inasmuch as the doctrine was codified into a set of binding rules and principles applicable in contexts often very different from those in which Marx and Lenin wrote. It was *less* in that, for most of the Soviet period, Marxism–Leninism did indeed consist of a conscious selection from the works of Marx and Lenin by the Soviet political elite, with particular leaders or theoreticians acquiring considerable power *over* Marxism–Leninism. Most of what was produced (especially for mass consumption) was a slimmed-down and simplified Marx and Lenin, in which some parts of their writings were deliberately accorded much greater weight than others. In this way, Marxism–Leninism was put to effective use as an instrument of legitimation of the rule of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and as a means of imposing strict limits on acceptable political discourse and behaviour.

There is a large literature on whether Leninism was a distortion (or, as some have argued, a Russification) of Marxism, or whether the one followed logically from the other.<sup>1</sup> Both Marx and Lenin were extraordinarily prolific writers, and thus there is ample scope for finding different emphases in their works and for building different interpretations on divergent readings of their theoretical analyses. Certainly there are different Marxisms, and Marxism–Leninism, as developed in the Soviet Union, is only one of the Marxist traditions. Politically, however, it has been far and away the most important and influential.

So far as Marx is concerned, his absolute rejection of the market in economics (as distinct from a social–democratic critique which emphasises the limitations of the market) and his failure to postulate an essential role for legitimate conflict in politics can be seen as slippery foundation stones on which Lenin built. Within Lenin’s own work there are very different emphases at different times. Some see ‘two Lenins’ – the Lenin of ‘War Communism’, the earliest years of Soviet power, 1917–1921, and the Lenin of NEP, the New Economic Policy (when concessions were made to the market, though not to political pluralism) launched in 1921 and ended by Stalin in 1928. War Communism had seen the nationalisation of industry and trade, compulsory food deliveries by peasants, and obligatory labour service by the bourgeoisie, and, of course, a civil war which was ruthlessly conducted both by the Bolsheviks and their opponents. NEP, in contrast, involved concessions to private trade and the peasantry, an end to compulsory acquisitions, revival of a market economy, and retreat from class war.

An alternative way of seeing ‘two Lenins’ is to contrast the Lenin of *What is to be Done?*, the political tract Lenin wrote in 1902 in which he called for a revolutionary vanguard and strictly-disciplined Party to overthrow the tsarist state, and the Lenin of *The State and Revolution*, another political treatise which he wrote in the summer of 1917 between the February and October revolutions, that has often been interpreted as a much more liberal and even democratic document. At the time Lenin wrote the latter of these two tracts, as John Plamenatz observed half a century ago, he had ‘never had even a day’s administrative experience’.<sup>2</sup> Thus, he thought that running a state was a much less complex task than it turned out to be. As a result, in Plamenatz’s words, ‘the world acquired *The State and Revolution*, the most simple-minded and improbable of all famous political pamphlets’.<sup>3</sup>

Lenin in power – as distinct from Lenin the theoretician – was a realist, and for him, as for most Bolsheviks, the New Economic Policy launched in 1921 was a necessary but *temporary and tactical* retreat,

albeit one which might have to continue for a long time. Lenin envisaged a NEP-like policy lasting for decades, whereas Stalin put an end to it just four years after Lenin's death in January 1924. Those who want to think well of Lenin often refer to the writings of the late Lenin, the Lenin of the NEP period, as 'the most mature Lenin', a Lenin who had seen the error of his earlier ways. That is, in some measure, the view of Mikhail Gorbachev. Even though he parted company definitively with *Leninism* while he was still General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev tended to project on to Lenin an evolution of his views which in some ways prefigured his own intellectual journey. In Gorbachev's interpretation: 'Here was a revolutionary giant, a man of great culture, who ended up a captive of his own ideological constructs. At the end he was trying to break out of the closed circle of dogma encompassing him.'<sup>4</sup>

Endless debate has taken place on the issue of the part played by the thought of Marx and Lenin in contributing to the highly authoritarian (or, for the period of 'high Stalinism', totalitarian) character of the Soviet state. There are very strong participatory-democratic strands in the thought of Marx and Lenin, especially in their vision of socialism as distinct from the period of struggle against the capitalist state, but hardly pluralist-democratic, particularly in the case of Lenin.<sup>5</sup> Of decisive importance for later Soviet developments, it could be argued, was the absence of a place for legitimate political contestation. Though Lenin's *State and Revolution* has, indeed, been interpreted as an example of the democratic and libertarian side of Lenin's thought, in contrast with the authoritarian *What is to be Done?*, A.J. Polan based an entire book-length indictment of Leninist authoritarianism on an analysis, precisely, of *The State and Revolution* and its implications. Published appropriately enough in 1984, Polan's book is called *Lenin and the End of Politics*. In it he writes:

The 'libertarian' Lenin bears equal responsibility for the Gulag with the 'authoritarian' Lenin. Lenin's theory of the state rigorously outlawed all and any version of those political institutions and relationships that can make the triumph of the Gulag less likely. In their place, *The State and Revolution* put a concept of the state that already, in August 1917, was monolithic, authoritarian, single-willed and uncheckable.<sup>6</sup>

Yet, in the post-Stalin period a minority of reformist intellectuals within the ranks of the CPSU would draw upon the voluminous writings of Marx and Lenin to provide political cover for ideas that might

otherwise be deemed unorthodox or dangerous, making instrumental use of whatever texts suited their immediate purpose. There were also, in the pre-perestroika period, frustrated reformers who genuinely believed that Marxism and Leninism, in the course of their codification under Stalin and his successors, had been turned into an excessively static body of doctrine that betrayed the beliefs of the founding fathers. Such a view involved an idealisation of Lenin and an approach to his works which was, in its own way, as selective as that of the most orthodox party propagandists, but that is not to impugn the sincerity of all 'back to Lenin' enthusiasts. The Lenin of the New Economic Policy was, in fact, a source of inspiration for significant Russian reformers. Ideological belief systems thrive as a result of the filtering out of discrepant knowledge and inconvenient facts. However desirable was rigorous analysis of the past political behaviour of the Bolsheviks and of their canonical texts, this took place to only a limited extent even within the dissident movement. To give public voice to criticism of Marx and Lenin was unthinkable – until Gorbachev had made the Soviet Union safe for dissent—for the overwhelming majority whose priorities included keeping their jobs and staying out of prison.

However, although Gorbachev, especially in the earliest years of his leadership, frequently invoked Lenin, neither Leninism, however refined, nor official Soviet Marxism–Leninism could provide a basis for democratic or pluralising reforms. To the extent that these became serious objectives, they were sooner or later bound to produce a collision between reformers and the conservative guardians of official ideology. This can readily be seen if we compare the fundamental tenets of codified Marxism–Leninism with the ideas which gained political and ideological hegemony in the last years of the Soviet Union. The latter are discussed throughout this book.

### **Esoteric debate on Marxism–Leninism**

The most basic principles of Marxism–Leninism in the form it had taken by the eve of the launching of perestroika were the following: (1) The idea that class struggle was the dynamic force whereby one socio-economic system was replaced by another; (2) The inevitability of progression from capitalist to socialist systems, with socialism eventually giving way to communism, as state functions were replaced by self-administration (although that supposedly final stage in the development of human society received little emphasis, as compared with that on the 'socialist state', and receded, even doctrinally, into an

ever-more-distant future); (3) The insistence that socialism consisted not only of state or co-operative ownership and control of the means of production and distribution but also of the type of political system that had been established in the Soviet Union; (4) The operational principle that the Communist Party was, in the words of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, ‘the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system’ (meaning in political practice the CPSU’s monopoly of political power); and (5) The equally crucial *modus operandi* of ‘democratic centralism’ as the organisational basis of societal and, more specifically, intra-party life, involving strict discipline and hierarchical subordination within the ruling party and exceedingly narrow limits on public debate.

There was often, to put it mildly, a tension between the Marxism of Marx (itself, of course, a subject of protracted debate and far from free of ambiguity) and codified Soviet Marxism–Leninism. Thus, Marx’s materialist conception of history meant that the economic development of society and, in particular, changes in the modes of production (which gave rise to the division of society into classes and produced the class struggle) had explanatory primacy over ideas and institutions. Ideas acquired influence or hegemony because they reflected the interests of the ruling class. Although state institutions had a limited autonomy, they constituted the superstructure of society as distinct from its more fundamental economic base. While Soviet ideology embraced that doctrine, parts of it contradicted it. The heavy emphasis in orthodox Soviet doctrine from Stalin’s time onwards on the authority of the state – together with the enormous power wielded by party and state political institutions in political practice – remained at odds with the Marxist historical materialism that was, nevertheless, taught in all Soviet higher educational institutions. Moreover, even the official Marxism–Leninism was not static. In Khrushchev’s time the idea that Soviet society was a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ gave way to the scarcely Marxist notion of a ‘state of the whole people’, though politicians and theorists continued to emphasise the ‘leading role of the working class’. In so far as the ruling ideas of the USSR were the ideas of the ruling class, in Soviet orthodoxy this meant ideas that were in the interest of the *working class*.

Even in Leonid Brezhnev’s time a minority of relatively bold and innovative Soviet analysts succeeded in providing camouflaged critiques of the Soviet system which accepted some aspects of official ideology but drew very different conclusions from those of the guardians of official Marxism–Leninism. Thus, for example, Valery Kalensky, a covert

critic of the system, whose condemnatory views were to become increasingly overt and who emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1985 (thus missing the opportunity to benefit from the new freedoms of speech and publication that were soon to follow), accepted, for the purposes of his argument at least, that the working class constituted the ruling class of the Soviet Union. But, after armouring himself with quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin, he went on to write in a book published in Moscow in 1977:

The concentration of enormous power in the hands of bureaucrats (*chinovniki*) has most serious political consequences, and leads namely to the acquisition by that special social stratum of a relative autonomy in relation to the ruling class as a whole, and to its being in certain circumstances even in conflict with it, thrusting upon it selfish interests of its own.<sup>7</sup>

Kalensky could get away with such writing in the 1970s because he was ostensibly talking about the relative autonomy of the state, or the bureaucracy, in general – in very broad comparative terms – rather than referring to the Soviet Union specifically. When I asked Kalensky two years after his book appeared if he had the Soviet Union in mind when he wrote such passages, he replied: ‘Of course’, and to the question, ‘Do your readers here [in Moscow] realise that?’, his answer was: ‘All those whose opinion I care about do!’ (Some strands of foreign critical Marxist analysis of the Soviet Union, in contrast, contended that official Soviet ideology did, indeed, reflect the interests of the ruling class, but that it was the higher reaches of the Soviet *nomenklatura* – the party and state bureaucracy and their senior appointees – who made up that ruling class. The substance of their view of the Soviet party–state bureaucracy was not so far apart from the views of within-system critics such as Kalensky<sup>8</sup> as the conceptual discrepancy between their analyses would suggest, since they argued that the official ideology provided the smokescreen behind which the ruling stratum wielded power.)

Even in Stalin’s time the party line, including what constituted ideological correctness, changed from time to time, but since a person could easily pay for deviation from that line with his or her life, this was not conducive to even muted debate, but rather to pervasive conformism and a desperate attempt to demonstrate the utmost loyalty to whatever the line might be. Change occurred gradually after Stalin’s death and it was more significant than many internal and

external observers appreciated in those years. While the Soviet Union remained a highly oppressive society up to the mid-1980s, Stalin's demise in March 1953 put an end to mass terror. In the new conditions esoteric debate began to be possible *within* Marxism–Leninism.

A changing terminology, first of all in small-circulation specialist books and journals and later in sections of the mass media, placed a new emphasis on the *political*, and terms such as 'political system', 'political culture' and 'political power' gradually entered the Soviet lexicon.<sup>9</sup> The acceptance of new terms was accompanied by esoteric debate and behind-the-scenes struggle, but it was not until the second half of the 1980s that terminological innovation was complemented by more fundamental discussion of key concepts and advanced by the deployment of these concepts in empirical analysis of Soviet politics and society. In foreign policy analysis and the study of the outside world, there was, likewise, significant intellectual innovation prior to the perestroika period, although that, too, remained within definite limits until the coming to power of Gorbachev.<sup>10</sup> Esoteric debate was conducted, for example, on such weighty topics as *détente* (between those who favoured a genuine easing of international tension and their hard-line opponents),<sup>11</sup> on the distribution of power within American politics and society,<sup>12</sup> on China (often as a disguised way of discussing Soviet developments),<sup>13</sup> on the type of social systems to be found in the Third World,<sup>14</sup> and on the merits and demerits of West European integration.<sup>15</sup> What remained crucial, however, in the pre-perestroika years was the deep gulf that persisted between the more radical views that could sometimes find their way into print and the doctrine espoused by the top party leadership. Moreover, it was blindingly obvious that no author could hope to be published who mounted an open attack on the basic assumptions of Soviet Marxism–Leninism.

Those who tried to stretch the limits of political acceptability in their writings were engaged in a battle of wits with the upholders of party orthodoxy that produced at best modest victories, usually more terminological than substantial, for they were confronted by a hierarchy of rewards (for conformist behaviour) and punishments (for deviation) which were the hallmark of a regime with well-honed instruments of political control. Most critics made the compromises necessary to hold down their jobs and to avoid attracting the attention of the KGB. They could also take the not unreasonable view that in Soviet conditions serious change was more likely to make headway if it emanated from within the system. A few took the further fateful steps that led from what the late Alexander Shtromas called 'intrastructural dissent' to



'extrastructural dissent'.<sup>16</sup> As Shtromas pointed out, even the two most famous dissidents of the post-Stalin era,<sup>17</sup> Andrey Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, began by trying to exercise influence from within the system – as 'intrastructural' dissenters – and it was when the Soviet authorities clamped down on them that they made the moral choice not to backtrack but to accept the status of overt dissidents. This brought concomitant persecution, albeit somewhat modified in the cases of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn – for example, internal and external exile rather than prison – on account of their fame and the interest taken in them in the West.<sup>18</sup> While Shtromas, writing at the beginning of the 1980s, stressed the positive role played by the overt dissidents, he also rightly observed: '[Political] change will most probably come not from without but from within the official system; "intrastructural", rather than overt "extrastructural", dissent will bring it about.'<sup>19</sup>

Marxism–Leninism provided theoretical legitimation for the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Their right to rule was not accorded by democratic elections, for though even the unreformed Soviet Union was declared by its leaders and propagandists to be a 'socialist democracy', the most elementary criteria of democracy – namely, free and fair contested elections – were wholly absent. It was, rather, Marxism–Leninism, the 'science of society' in the official Soviet formulation, which decreed the guiding role of the party, and the dominance of its top leadership, in the construction and development of 'socialism'. The corollary of the great concentration of power at the top of the Soviet political hierarchy was that change in the top leadership could open up the possibility of ideological change. Ideational innovation occurred when Khrushchev succeeded Stalin and, again, when Brezhnev succeeded Khrushchev. The changes included Khrushchev's insistence that the Soviet Union had entered, as the 1961 Party Programme put it, 'the period of full-scale construction of communism' and the prediction that communism 'in the main' would be built by around 1980 and, in contrast, the more cautious formulation of the Brezhnev years that the Soviet Union had entered the stage of 'developed socialism'. What these changes had in common – apart from being remote from the reality of the society around them, with its gross inefficiencies and injustices – was that they did not challenge the fundamental principles on which the Soviet system was constructed.

Gorbachev did not *begin* by doing so either, but his policy of *glasnost*' (openness or transparency), allowed reformers within the intelligentsia,

even between 1985 and 1987, to push ever wider the limits of the possible. Gorbachev's own thinking in the mid-1980s was a mixture of the old and the new. That did not necessarily work against systemic change a few years later. Even if Gorbachev and his allies had come in 1985–86 to as damning a verdict on the Soviet system as they had reached by the end of the decade, they could not have got away with a frontal attack on the system's foundations. As Aleksandr Yakovlev, the most radical of Gorbachev's appointees to the Politburo, put it (in a lecture delivered in the Vatican in January 1992):

In many respects, though not in all, the transformations were doomed to be inconsistent. A consistent radicalism in the first years of perestroika would have destroyed the very idea of comprehensive reform. A united revolt of the apparatus – party, state, security-repressive organs, and economic – would have thrown the country back to the worst times of Stalinism. The context at that time was absolutely different from today.<sup>20</sup>

From 1988, both as a result of evolution of opinion among the reformist minority of the party leadership (which included, crucially, the most significant power-holder, the General Secretary) and of the political space opened up for increasingly autonomous activity within the intelligentsia, the fundamentals of the system began to be called into question quite publicly.<sup>21</sup> Gorbachev himself, who had begun his General Secretaryship in March 1985 believing that the Soviet system could be reformed and rejuvenated, had by the summer of 1988 reached the conclusion that it needed to be fundamentally transformed or dismantled.<sup>22</sup>

### **A new language of politics**

A new language of politics emerged. Ideas were promulgated in political discourse which broke fundamentally with Marxism–Leninism. The term, 'New Political Thinking', was endorsed by the party leadership and many of the ideas encapsulated by it were, indeed, new in the Soviet context. Language, as James Farr has observed, is 'an arena of political action' and 'where there are different concepts, there are different beliefs, and so different actions and practices'.<sup>23</sup> Growing intellectual freedom and a cascade of ideas of remarkable novelty in twentieth-century Russia became the prelude to radical systemic change.

Quite soon after he succeeded Chernenko as General Secretary in March 1985 – to be precise, at the twenty-seventh Party Congress in early 1986 – Gorbachev began the process of consigning the Brezhnevian notion of ‘developed socialism’ to the dustbin of history. Noting that it had been introduced as a reaction against the facile doctrine of the Khrushchev era on the speedy building of communism, he observed that it in turn had become a complacent conception that concentrated on successes and ignored the real problems of the Soviet economy and society. ‘Today’, said Gorbachev, with the party committed to ‘the acceleration (*uskorenie*) of socio-economic development’, such an approach was ‘unacceptable’.<sup>24</sup> It was ‘developed socialism’, among other concepts, he had in mind when he spoke to the January 1987 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Party about the way in which ‘all manner of scholastic theorizing, having no bearing on anyone’s interests and vital problems, was often even encouraged in the country, while attempts to carry out a constructive analysis and put forward new ideas were not supported’.<sup>25</sup>

In the early years of Gorbachev’s leadership political discourse still took place within a Marxist–Leninist framework, albeit one which was far less tightly constraining than hitherto. It was increasingly becoming the case that, provided someone could find a quotation from Marx or, better still, Lenin, to support it, that person could put forward radical ideas which would have got him or her into serious trouble just a few years earlier. In a short book delivered to the publisher early in 1988 and published in 1989 even the liberal economist, Yegor Gaydar (whose first decision as acting prime minister in post-Soviet Russia was to free prices), and his co-author, Stanislav Shatalin (a market reformer of an older generation), found it prudent to cite Lenin and to draw on Soviet writing from the NEP period.<sup>26</sup> The thrust of their arguments was, however, far removed from traditional Soviet doctrine.

The ‘New Thinking’, or ‘New Political Thinking’, of the Gorbachev era in its earliest stages embodied both the advantages and limitations of ‘revisionism’.<sup>27</sup> It was a flexible interpretation of Marx and Lenin which began to draw on ideas from NEP, from Bukharin, from the ‘Prague Spring’, from Eurocommunists – from the entire alternative tradition within Communism which had been labelled and castigated as revisionist. As Leszek Kolakowski, discussing the earlier East European revisionists, put it: ‘The peculiarity of the situation was that both Marxism and Leninism spoke a language full of humane and democratic slogans which, while they were empty rhetoric as far as the system of power was concerned, could be and were invoked against that

system.<sup>28</sup> In the case of Russia in the second half of the 1980s, there were intellectuals who had been influenced by ideas that owed little to Marxism and nothing to Leninism – in particular, by social democratic thought. Many of the theorists and social scientists within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who elaborated innovative ideas were, in effect, closet social democrats. They had seen the future (in Western Europe), and it appeared to work. With each successive year of perestroika, the non-Leninist and social democratic strand in the thinking of Gorbachev and his allies in the leadership became ever more overt and prominent.

The 'New Thinking' on the Soviet political system, which displaced Marxism–Leninism, proceeded apace and it is significant that the new ideas preceded the new practice. Some of the groundwork for this ideological change had been laid in difficult conditions long before Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko as party leader, but between 1987 and 1990 there was what amounted to a *conceptual revolution* as well as a radical reform, and subsequent transformation, of the political system. Concepts which had either been marginalised by Soviet Marxism–Leninism or which had no place at all within that tradition were brought into the forefront of political discourse.

Many of those with a vested interest in the unreformed political system put up a fierce resistance to the conceptual innovation which they identified as ideological subversion. The reason it is legitimate to speak about the *demise of* Marxism–Leninism in Russia is that all but a handful of serious political actors had abandoned most of the traditional doctrine by the last year of the Soviet Union's existence. This was true even of the putschists whose attempted coup in August 1991 was aimed at the removal of Gorbachev and the reintroduction of highly authoritarian rule. The Chairman of the KGB at that time, Vladimir Kryuchkov, who was a leading figure in the self-appointed State Committee for the State of Emergency which put Gorbachev under house arrest at his holiday home in Foros on the Crimean coast and attempted to assume the reins of power, went so far as to say that 'for us the question of capitalism or socialism was a second order question'.<sup>29</sup> Preservation of the Soviet state was, he said, their primary concern, though in reality their actions achieved the opposite result and accelerated its breakup.<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, if we examine the documents of the leading figures of the reaction against perestroika in 1991, both the declaration of the so-called State Committee for the State of Emergency after they had isolated Gorbachev in Foros, and the earlier preparatory document for

their coup, 'A Word to the People', published on 23 July 1991, we find no trace of Marxism–Leninism, but an appeal to the greatness of the Russian state and an anti-Westernism (which, admittedly, was strongly present in Stalinist ideology, but at that time accompanied also by doctrine derived from Lenin). 'A Word to the People', was composed by nationalistic writers and signed by twelve conservative political figures, among them two of those who were part of the State Committee for the State of Emergency – the coup leaders – the following month (Vasily Starodubtsev and Aleksandr Tizyakov) and, more intriguingly, Gennady Zyuganov, at that time an official within the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and in post-Soviet Russia the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

The document asked how it could have happened that 'we admitted to power people who do not love this country, who fawn on their overseas patrons and seek advice and blessing there, across the seas'.<sup>31</sup> In one passage, which must have had Stalin and Brezhnev turning in their graves, and Lenin sorely troubled in his mausoleum, these defenders of the Soviet state and present-day leaders of the Communist Party said:

We appeal to the Orthodox Church, which, having gone through Calvary, is slowly, after all the beatings, rising from the grave. The church, whose spiritual light shone in Russian history even during dark times, is today, while still gaining new strength, being torn by strife in dioceses and parishes, and is not finding proper support from the temporal powers. May it hear the voice of the people calling for salvation.<sup>32</sup>

## **Post-Soviet developments**

If Marxism–Leninism was at a very low ebb in the last months of the Soviet Union, it is legitimate to ask, nevertheless, if it has made a comeback in the post-Soviet era. The kind of capitalism that has been built, with its extremes of inequality and of fortunes made by the most dubious means, could be regarded as fertile ground for those who would espouse Marxism–Leninism. Yet that body of doctrine has shown no sign of political revival. This is not to ignore the fact that the Communist Party has been able to maintain a strong presence in the legislature, appealing to many of those who were among the millions of losers in Yel'tsin's Russia. Three things are, however, clear. First, that support is declining. In the December 2003 elections for the State Duma

the Communist Party got only half as many votes as it did in the election four years earlier and less than half as many seats.<sup>33</sup> This, admittedly, owed something to the lack of fairness of the election, with the resources of the state and the mass media mobilised behind United Russia, the Kremlin's favoured party. The second point is that as a hegemonic ideology, Marxism–Leninism has entirely lost out. Insofar as there is now an official ideology in Russia, it is one which draws on nostalgia for some aspects of the Soviet order, but which pays no heed to Marxism–Leninism. Third, even the Communist Party's appeal – such as it is – has been based not primarily on Leninist ideology, but on a mixed bag of doctrine, including elements which are far removed from any of the variants of Marxism–Leninism promulgated in the Soviet Union. In particular, the party's leader and principal spokesman, Gennady Zyuganov, has expressed support for the market and a 'developed private sector' alongside a strong state sector – in other words, for a 'mixed economy' which, on paper at least, bears a closer relationship to the economic aspirations over many years of European non-Communist socialists than to traditional Soviet ideology.<sup>34</sup> Zyuganov has, moreover, espoused an eclectic ideology which is far more overtly nationalist than Soviet Marxism–Leninism, notwithstanding the element of hidden nationalism *it* contained. In that respect, Zyuganov's thinking is far removed from that of mainstream European socialist parties. While the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has different strands within it, some of them closer to orthodox Marxism–Leninism than the views expressed by the party leader, it has become more ideologically incoherent than its Soviet predecessor. That, paradoxically, has been part of the secret of its relative breadth of appeal (up until, at least, the 2003 Duma election). As Luke March, the author of an important study of the CPRF, has written:

For many in the leadership, tactical changes such as the acceptance of the mixed economy and pluralism seemed to become accepted as integral parts of the communist model, and possibly as ends in themselves. Yet ... there are limits to the extent to which communist parties can both incorporate elements of pluralist doctrines and compete in pluralistic politics before they lose distinctiveness and coherence.<sup>35</sup>

It is true that the Russian Communists still have pictures of Lenin at their meetings and they are absolutely opposed to removing Lenin's body from the mausoleum in Red Square. But Lenin is just one of their

symbols, and party leader Gennady Zyuganov has seemed at times to be a fellow-traveller of Christianity, going so far in April 1998 as to criticise Yel'tsin for making a foreign trip during Easter week. Accepting the Orthodox Church as one of the symbols of Russian statehood, the dominant tendency within the CPRF has tried to unite the traditions of Soviet and Russian patriotism. March makes the point that from 1995 onwards the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation have said different things to their core membership and to the public at large. For the benefit of the former, references to Marxism–Leninism do occur in documents intended mainly for internal consumption, but these are left out of the party's electoral platform when they are attempting to win the support of voters.<sup>36</sup> This suggests that even the main successor party to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has little confidence in the popular appeal of Marxism–Leninism.

Within the camp of the person who was an easy victor in the 2000 presidential election and who, following the Duma election of 2003, looked certain to be re-elected in 2004, Vladimir Putin, there is, of course, not the slightest concession to socialism or to Marxism–Leninism, but still more genuflection to state power and to the Orthodox Church. Indeed, much more effectively than the Communists, Putin has succeeded in drawing on the traditions of both Soviet and Russian patriotism, thereby uniting two rather different constituencies in support of the quasi-capitalist post-Communist economic system and the 'managed pluralism' characteristic of the post-Soviet hybrid political system.<sup>37</sup> While under Putin the law has been applied selectively against tycoons who have shown too much independence, the principle of private ownership, including ownership of natural resources attained at the expense of the long-suffering Russian public, has not been called into question, provided that it is accompanied by political loyalty. Throughout the post-Soviet period the political regime has hovered uneasily between democracy and authoritarianism, but even when authoritarian tendencies have threatened to gain the upper hand, there has been no recourse to Marxism–Leninism by way of ideological justification.

In the chapters that follow two things should become still clearer: first, that there was innovative political thinking in Russia both before and after perestroika; and, second, that it was, nevertheless, in those six-and-a-half years beginning in March 1985 that a conceptual revolution occurred. In Chapter 2, particular attention is paid to the development of non-Leninist thinking on the political system. Alec

Nove, in Chapter 3, illustrates the radicalism of the departure from Marxism–Leninism among economists who gained intellectual and political ascendancy during the Gorbachev years (and who, in some cases, were able more fully to put their precepts into practice during Yel'tsin's years at the helm).

Igor Timofeyev, in the following chapter, provides a detailed analysis of the development of liberal thought – not only in its economic dimension – in Russia after 1985. Even when the holders of state power in subsequent years have acted illiberally, and as concern among committed Russian democrats has grown at signs of creeping authoritarianism, there is and remains a huge body of liberal ideas in the public domain, including Russian editions of Western classical texts as well as the more recent contributions of Russian intellectuals.

Gail Lapidus, in Chapter 5, elaborates on the remarkable ideational and political transformation that took place in the last years of the Soviet Union regarding nationalism, federalism and sovereignty. She notes, too, the continued weakness of Marxist–Leninist ideology in the post-Soviet period, while observing that along with the benefits of the rejection of Leninism have gone some of the constraints upon overt manifestations of national chauvinism which the Soviet ideology imposed.

In no sphere was the conceptual revolution of the perestroika years greater than in that of foreign policy, whether in relation to East–West relations and the ending of the Cold War, or in what amounted to the abandonment of world Communism, both as a movement and as a goal. Alexander Dallin, accordingly, in Chapters 6 and 7, analyses the transformation of Soviet thinking in the last years of the USSR concerning those two inter-related areas of policy. In a final chapter, T.H. Rigby brings together some of the various strands contained in earlier chapters and adds his reflections on the moral dimension of new thinking in Russia. Examining the fate of Marxism–Leninism in post-Soviet as well as late Soviet Russia, he sees little or no prospect of this discredited ideology making a comeback, notwithstanding the new injustices and inequalities that call out for a radical critique.

## Notes

- 1 For contrasting views on that issue, see John Plamenatz, *German Marxism and Russian Communism* (London: Longman, 1954) and Neil Harding, *Lenin's Political Thought*, Volumes 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1977 and 1981). See also Robert Service, *Lenin: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 2000).
- 2 Plamenatz, *German Marxism and Russian Communism*, p. 245.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 248.



- 4 Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 51. Or, as Gorbachev put it, earlier in those same conversations: ‘it was around 1983 that I concluded that Lenin had seen that his efforts had failed, that democracy for the mass of the people had in practice been stifled. And for me the primary slogan to put forward in 1985 was “more socialism, more democracy”. More democracy and more freedom in all things, both in economics and politics’ (*Conversations with Gorbachev*, p. 66).
- 5 Even Marx’s pluralist credentials were weak. As his recent, empathetic biographer Francis Wheen puts it colourfully: ‘In [Marx’s] speeches and editorials he insisted that Germany must have a democratic government “of the most heterogeneous elements” rather than a dictatorship of brilliant communists such as himself; but the vehemence with which he delivered these views – flinging insults and derision at anyone who dared disagree – suggested that this was a man who wouldn’t recognise pluralism if it was served to him on a silver salver with watercress garnish’. See Wheen, *Karl Marx* (London: Fourth Estate, 1999), pp. 135–6.
- 6 A.J. Polan, *Lenin and the End of Politics* (London: Methuen, 1984), p. 130.
- 7 V.G. Kalensky, *Gosudarstvo kak ob’ekt sotsiologicheskogo analiza (ocherki i metodologii issledovaniya)* (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1977), p. 123.
- 8 Like the great majority of his fellow-researchers at the Institute of State and Law (Moscow) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Kalensky was a member of the Communist Party.
- 9 For further discussion of this, see Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Archie Brown, ‘Political Power and the Soviet State’ in Neil Harding (ed.), *The State in Socialist Society* (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 51–103; and Archie Brown, ‘Political Science in the USSR’ in *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1986, pp. 443–81.
- 10 The fullest analysis of this is to be found in Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
- 11 For discussion of this, see, for example, Allen Lynch, *The Soviet Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988); and Stephen Shenfield, *The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge, 1987).
- 12 See especially Neil Malcolm, *Soviet Political Scientists and American Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1984).
- 13 Gilbert Rozman, *A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Alexander Lukin, *The Bear and the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian–Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), Chapters 2 and 3.
- 14 Especially Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986).
- 15 Julie M. Newton, *Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe* (London: Palgrave, 2003); and George Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), *Learning in US and*

- Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), especially Chapter 13 (by Jonathan Haslam) and Chapter 18 (by Robert Legvold).
- 16 Alexander Shtromas, *Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1981), especially pp. 82–7.
  - 17 The very concept of ‘dissidents’ would have been meaningless in Stalin’s time when, for entirely imaginary political deviation, intellectuals could be executed as ‘enemies of the people’.
  - 18 Solzhenitsyn *had*, of course, served time in the Gulag, but that was in the Stalin era and before he had achieved fame as a writer. He was arrested in 1945, in labour camps from then until 1953, and from 1953 to 1956 in internal exile in Soviet Kazakhstan.
  - 19 Shtromas, *Political Change and Social Development*, p. 86.
  - 20 Aleksandr Yakovlev, *Predislovie, Obval, Posleslovie* (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), p. 267.
  - 21 See, for example, Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Anatoly Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2000); Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn’ i reformy*, 2 volumes (Moscow: Novosti, 1995); Andrey Grachev, *Gorbachev* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001); and Georgy Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: Reformatsiya Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnikov* (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993).
  - 22 *Ibid.* The dismantling of the *system* must be sharply distinguished from the dismantling of the *state*. The breakup of the Soviet Union into fifteen successor states was very much an unintended consequence of perestroika and an outcome Gorbachev struggled unsuccessfully to avoid.
  - 23 James Farr, ‘Understanding Conceptual Change Politically’ in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson, *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 29.
  - 24 M.S. Gorbachev, ‘Politicheskii doklad tsentral’nogo komiteta KPSS XXVII s’ezdu Kommunisticheskogo Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza’, 22 February, 1986, in M.S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat’i*, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), p. 276.
  - 25 M.S. Gorbachev, ‘O perestrojke i kadrovoy politike partii’, speech of 27 January, 1987, to a plenary session of the Central Committee, in Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat’i*, Vol. 4 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), pp. 302–3.
  - 26 S.S. Shatalin and E.T. Gaydar, *Ekonomicheskaya reforma: prichiny, napravleniya, problemy* (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1989), p. 52.
  - 27 On revisionism, especially in the East European context, see Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth and Dissolution*, Vol. III, *The Breakdown* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), especially pp. 456–78.
  - 28 *Ibid.*, p. 460.
  - 29 Kryuchkov was speaking at a small conference on the Cold War (in which I participated), held at the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in Moscow in June 1999, jointly organised by that Institute and the Merston Center of Ohio State University. The unusual feature of this round-table conference was that the main interlocutors of the small group of Western scholars were those who mounted the August 1991 coup.
  - 30 On the coup, see Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, *op. cit.*, pp. 294–305; and Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, pp. 371–423. The memoirs of

Gorbachev's aide, Anatoly Chernyaev, include in the American edition an 'Afterword' (pp. 401–23) in which he responds to the later concoctions of the putschists that, having put Gorbachev (and his immediate entourage, including Chernyaev) under house arrest, they had, nevertheless, left him free to leave for Moscow at any time, a ludicrous invention which a few Western authors who should have known better chose to disseminate.

31 *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 23 July, 1991, p. 1.

32 *Ibid.*

33 See *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 20 December–27 December, 2003, pp. 2 and 10–11; and [www.russiavotes.org/2003RESULT.HTM](http://www.russiavotes.org/2003RESULT.HTM).

34 See, for example, the interview with Zyuganov in *Pravda*, 22–23 May 1999, pp. 1–2, and p. 2.

35 Luke March, *The Communist Party of the Russian Federation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 117–118.

36 March, pp. 84, 91–2 and 101.

37 On Putin's appeal to both Soviet and Russian symbols, see Archie Brown, 'Vladimir Putin and the Reaffirmation of Central State Power', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January–March 2001, pp. 45–55, especially p. 52; and on 'managed pluralism', see Harley Balzer, 'Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin's Emerging Regime', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 3, July–September 2003, pp. 189–227.

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"PREFACE Every girl wants to be attractive. In this book we have capitalized on this motivation to help girls develop skills of lasting value to themselves and to their families. Starting with simple grooming procedures and the art of choosing becoming lines, textures, and colors, we have gone on to show how to choose clothes and accessories that create harmonious costumes.Â Contents Foreword ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii Glossary xv Part 1 A Few Pioneers, 1898-1916 1 Part 2 Test of Strength, 1917-1919 23 Part 3 The Twenties, 1920-1929 47 Part 4 The Thirties, 1930-1939 77 Parts World War II, 1940-1945 101 Part 6 Postwar Years, 1946-1949 159 Part 7 Korean Operations, 1950-1953 183 Part 8 The.Â ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS. Politik Aktion Member. Bulstro Archivist.

PREFACE. This book describes the theory and practice of corpo-rate finance. We hardly need to explain why financial managers should master the practical aspects of their job, but we should spell out why down-to-earth, red-blooded managers need to bother with theory.Â ix. Brealeyâˆ”Meyers: Principles of Corporate Finance, Seventh Edition. Front Matter. Preface. Â© The McGrawâˆ”Hill Companies, 2003. x PREFACE.Â PREFACE. xi. We should mention two matters of style now to prevent confusion later. First, the most important fi-nancial terms are set out in boldface type the first time they appear; less important but useful terms are given in italics. Second, most algebraic symbols rep-resenting dollar values are shown as capital letters. The glossary of igneous terms has been fully updated since the 1st edition and now includes 1637 entries, of which 316 are recommended by the Subcommittee, 312 are regarded as local terms, and 413 are now considered obsolete. Incorporating a comprehensive list of source references for all the terms included in the glossary, this book will be an indispensable reference guide for all geologists studying igneous rocks, either in the i-eld or the laboratory. It presents a standardized and widely accepted naming scheme that will allow geologists to interpret terminology found in the primary literat