

IMMANUEL KANT

*Critique of the
power of judgment*

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I.

On the division of philosophy.

If one divides philosophy, insofar as it contains principles of rational cognition of things by means of concepts (not merely, like logic, principles of the form of thinking in general^a without distinction of objects), into **theoretical** and **practical**, as is customary, then one proceeds entirely correctly. But then the concepts that refer the principles of this rational cognition to its object must also be specifically distinct, since otherwise they would not justify any division, which always presupposes an opposition between the principles of the rational cognition belonging to the different parts of a science.

There are, however, only two sorts of concepts that allow an equal number of distinct principles of the possibility of their objects: namely the **concepts of nature** and the **concept of freedom**. Now since the former make possible a **theoretical** cognition of nature in accordance with *a priori* principles, but the latter includes within its concept in that regard only a negative principle (of mere opposition), while on the contrary it attains ampliative principles for the determination of the will, which on that account are called practical: thus philosophy is justifiably divided into two parts, entirely distinct as far as their principles are concerned, namely, the theoretical, as **philosophy of nature**, and the practical, as **moral philosophy** (for thus is the practical legislation of reason in accordance with the concept of freedom named). Hitherto, however, a great misuse of these expressions for the division of the different principles, and with them also of philosophy, has prevailed: for that which is practical in accordance with concepts of nature has been taken to be the same as that which is practical in accordance with the concept of freedom, and thus, under the same designations of theoretical and practical philosophy, a division has been made through which, in fact (since both parts could have the same principles), nothing has been divided.

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The will, as the faculty of desire, is one of the many kinds of natural causes in the world, namely that which operates in accordance with

^a In the first edition: “like logic does, which contains the form of thinking in general . . .”

concepts; and everything that is represented as possible (or necessary) through a will is called practically possible (or necessary), in distinction from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect to which the cause is not determined to causality through concepts (but rather, as in the case of lifeless matter, through mechanism, or, in the case of animals, through instinct). – Now here it is left indeterminate with regard to the practical whether the concept that gives the rule to the causality of the will is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom.

However, the latter distinction is essential. For if the concept determining the causality is a concept of nature, then the principles are **technically practical**, but if it is a concept of freedom, then these are **morally practical**; and since in the division of a rational science what is at issue is entirely this sort of difference of objects, the cognition of which requires distinct principles, the former will belong to theoretical philosophy (as a doctrine of nature), while the latter^a will entirely by itself constitute the second part, namely practical philosophy (as a doctrine of morals).^b

All technically practical rules (i.e., those of art and skill in general, as well as those of prudence, as a skill in influencing human beings and their will), so far as their principles rest on concepts, must be counted only as corollaries of theoretical philosophy. For they concern only the possibility of things in accordance with concepts of nature, to which belong not only the means thereto that are to be encountered in nature, but even the will (as a faculty of desire, hence as a natural faculty), insofar as it can be determined through natural incentives in accordance with those rules. Hence practical rules of that kind are not called laws (like, say, physical laws), but only precepts: and precisely because the will does not merely stand under the concept of nature, but also under the concept of freedom, in relation to which its principles are called laws, and alone constitute, together with their consequences, the second part of philosophy, namely the practical.

5: 173 Thus, as little as the solution of the problems of pure geometry belongs to a special part of it, or as little as the art of surveying deserves the name of a practical geometry, as a second part of geometry in general in contrast to pure geometry, even less should the mechanical or chemical art of experiments or observations be counted as a practical part of the doctrine of nature, or, finally, should domestic, agrarian and political economy, the art of social intercourse, the prescriptions of dietetics, the general doctrine of happiness itself or even the mastery of inclinations and the control of affects for the sake of the latter be counted as practical philosophy, or the latter constitute the second part

^a In the first edition, “the second.”

^b *Sittenlehre*

of philosophy as a whole; since all of these contain only rules of skill, which are thus only technically practical, for producing an effect that is possible in accordance with natural concepts of causes and effects which, since they belong to theoretical philosophy, are subject to^a these precepts as mere corollaries of it (of natural science), and thus cannot demand a place in a special philosophy which is called practical. By contrast, the morally practical precepts, which are grounded entirely on the concept of freedom to the complete exclusion of the determining grounds of the will from nature, constitute an entirely special kind of precept: which are also, like the rules that nature obeys, simply called laws, but which do not, like the latter, rest on sensible conditions, but on a supersensible principle, and require a second part of philosophy for themselves alone, alongside the theoretical part, under the name of practical philosophy.

It can be seen from this that a set of practical precepts provided by philosophy does not constitute a special part of it, alongside its theoretical part, just because they are practical; for they could be that even if their principles were derived entirely from the theoretical cognition of nature (as technically practical rules); rather they constitute such a special part when and if their principle is not borrowed from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned, and hence rests on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes knowable through formal laws, and they are therefore morally practical, i.e., not merely precepts and rules for this or that purpose, but laws, without prior reference to ends and aims.

II.

On the domain of philosophy in general.

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The use of our cognitive faculty in accordance with principles, and with this philosophy, extend as far as *a priori* concepts have their application.

However, the set of all objects to which those concepts are related, in order where possible to bring about a cognition of them, can be divided in accordance with the varying adequacy or inadequacy of our faculties for this purpose.

Concepts, insofar as they are related to objects, regardless of whether a cognition of the latter is possible or not, have their field, which is determined merely in accordance with the relation which their object has to our faculty of cognition in general. – The part of this field within which cognition is possible for us is a territory (*ter-*

^a The words “are subject to” in this clause, and “and thus” in the next, are added in the second edition.

ritorium) for these concepts and the requisite faculty of cognition. The part of the territory in which these are legislative is the domain (*ditio*) of these concepts and of the corresponding faculty of cognition. Thus empirical concepts do indeed have their territory in nature, as the set of all objects of sense, but no domain (only their residence, *domicilium*); because they are, to be sure, lawfully generated, but are not legislative, rather the rules grounded on them are empirical, hence contingent.

Our cognitive faculty as a whole has two domains, that of the concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom; for it is *a priori* legislative through both. Philosophy is also divided accordingly into the theoretical and the practical. But the territory on which their domain is established and^a their legislation **exercised** is always only the set of objects of all possible experience, insofar as they are taken as nothing more than mere appearances; for otherwise no legislation of the understanding with regard to them could be conceived.

5: 175 Legislation through concepts of nature takes place through the understanding, and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom takes place through reason, and is merely practical. Only in the practical alone can reason be legislative; with regard to theoretical cognition (of nature) it can only (by being well-versed in law by means of the understanding) draw inferences from given laws to conclusions that still always stop at nature. Conversely, however, where rules are practical, reason is not on that account immediately **legislative**, since they^b can also be technically practical.

Understanding and reason thus have two different legislations on one and the same territory of experience, without either being detrimental to the other. For just as little as the concept of nature influences legislation through the concept of freedom does the latter disturb the legislation of nature. – The possibility of at least conceiving without contradiction the coexistence^c of the two legislations and the faculties pertaining to them in one and the same subject was proved by the *Critique of Pure Reason*, when it annihilated the objections to this by exposing the dialectical illusion in them.⁴

But that these two different domains, which are inevitably limited^d not to be sure in their legislation but still in their effects in the sensible world, do not constitute **one** domain, stems from this: that the concept

^a The first edition adds “on which” here.

^b In the third edition, “the former.”

^c *Zusammenbestehen*

^d “which were . . . limited” in the first edition.

of nature certainly makes its objects representable in intuition, but not as things in themselves, rather as mere appearances, while the concept of freedom in its object makes a thing representable in itself but not in intuition, and thus neither of the two can provide a theoretical cognition of its object (and even of the thinking subject) as a thing in itself, which would be the supersensible, the idea of which must underlie the possibility of all those objects of experience, but which itself can never be elevated and expanded into a cognition.

There is thus an unlimited but also inaccessible field for our faculty of cognition as a whole, namely the field of the supersensible, in which we find no territory for ourselves, and thus cannot have on it a domain for theoretical cognition either for the concepts of the understanding or for those of reason, a field that we must certainly occupy with ideas for the sake of the theoretical as well as the practical use of reason, but^a for which, in relation to the laws from the concept of freedom, we can provide nothing but a practical reality, through which, accordingly, our theoretical cognition is not in the least extended to the supersensible.

Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as^b the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, so that from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible, just as if there were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second: yet the latter **should** have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom should^c make the end that is imposed by its laws real^d in the sensible world; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized^e in it in accordance with the laws of freedom. – Thus there must still be a ground of the **unity** of the supersensible that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically, the concept of which, even if it does not suffice for cognition of it either theoretically or practically, and thus has no proper domain of its own, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the manner of thinking in accordance with the principles of the one to that in accordance with the principles of the other.

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^a *aber* added in the second edition.

^b In the first edition, this word is *also* rather than *als*, i.e., “thus” instead of “as.”

^c Added in the second edition.

^d *wirklich*

^e *zu bewirkenden*

III.

On the critique of the power of judgment, as a means for combining the two parts of philosophy into one whole.

The critique of the faculties of cognition with regard to what they can accomplish *a priori* has, strictly speaking, no domain with regard to objects, because it is not a doctrine, but only has to investigate whether and how a doctrine is possible through it given the way it is situated with respect to our faculties. Its field extends to all the presumptions of that doctrine, in order to set it within its rightful limits. However, what cannot enter into the division of philosophy can nevertheless enter as a major part into the critique of the pure faculty of cognition in general if, namely, it contains principles that are for themselves fit neither for theoretical nor for practical use.

The concepts of nature, which contain the ground for all theoretical cognition *a priori*, rested on the legislation of the understanding. – The concept of freedom, which contains the ground for all sensibly unconditioned practical precepts *a priori*, rested on the legislation of reason. Both faculties thus have, in addition to the fact that in accordance with logical form they can be applied to principles whatever their origin might be, their own legislation concerning content, beyond which there is no other (*a priori*), which hence justifies the division of philosophy into the theoretical and the practical.

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But in the family of the higher faculties of cognition there is still an intermediary between the understanding and reason. This is the **power of judgment**, about which one has cause to presume, by analogy, that it too should contain in itself *a priori*, if not exactly its own legislation, then still a proper principle of its own for seeking laws, although a merely subjective one; which, even though it can claim no field of objects as its domain, can nevertheless have some territory and a certain constitution^a of it, for which precisely this principle only might be valid.

To this, however (to judge by analogy), a fresh ground is added for bringing the power of judgment into association with another ordering of our powers of representation, which seems to be of still greater importance than that of its kinship with the family of faculties of cognition. For all faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to the three that cannot be further derived from a common ground: the **faculty of cognition**, the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure**, and

^a *Beschaffenheit*

the **faculty of desire**.^{*} For the faculty of cognition only the understanding is legislative, if (as must be the case if it is considered for itself, without being mixed up with the faculty of desire), it is related as a faculty of a **theoretical cognition** to nature, with regard to which alone (as appearance) it is possible for us to give laws through *a priori* 5: 178

^{*} "It is useful to attempt a transcendental definition for concepts that are used as empirical principles if one has cause to conjecture that they have an affinity with the pure faculty of cognition *a priori*, on account of this relation: a definition, that is, through pure categories, insofar as these alone already yield the distinction between the concept in question and others. In this one follows the example of the mathematician, who leaves the empirical data of his problem undetermined and brings only their relation in their pure synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic and thereby generalizes their solution. – An objection has been made to me on the basis of a similar procedure (*Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 16 of the preface),⁵ and the definition of the faculty of desire as **the faculty for being through one's representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations** has been criticized because mere **wishes** are also desires, but yet everyone would concede that he could not produce their object by their means alone. – This, however, proves nothing more than that there are also desires in a human being as a result of which he stands in contradiction with himself, in that he works toward the production of the object by means of his representation **alone**, from which he can however expect no success, because he is aware that his mechanical powers (if I may so name those that are not psychological), which have to be determined through that representation in order to realize the object (hence mediately), are either inadequate or even aimed at something impossible, e.g., to make what has happened not have happened (*O mihi praeteritos*,^b etc.), or, when impatiently waiting, to make the time until the wished-for moment disappear. – Although in the case of such fantastic desires we are aware of the inadequacy of our representations (or their unsuitability) to be **causes** of their objects, nevertheless their relation as causes, hence the representation of their **causality**, is contained in every **wish**, and it is especially visible if this is an affect, namely **longing**. For the latter prove by the fact that they expand the heart and make it flaccid and thus exhaust our powers that the powers are repeatedly strained by means of representations, but the mind, in view of the impossibility, is inexorably allowed to sink back into exhaustion. Even the prayers for the avoidance of great and so far as one can see unavoidable evil and many superstitious means for the attainment of naturally impossible ends prove the causal relation of representations 5: 178

^a The footnote was added to the second edition.

^b Kant's reference is to Virgil's *Aeneid*, Book VIII, line 560, "*O mihi praeteritos referat si Juppiter annos*" ("If only Jupiter would give me back/The past years and the man I was"); translation by Robert Fitzgerald, *Virgil: The Aeneid* (New York: Random House, 1983), p. 249.

5: 179 concepts of nature, which are, strictly speaking, pure concepts of the understanding. – For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty in accordance with the concept of freedom, reason alone (in which alone this concept has its place) is legislative *a priori*. – Now between the faculty of cognition and that of desire there is the feeling of pleasure, just as the power of judgment is contained between the understanding and reason. It is therefore to be suspected at least provisionally that the power of judgment likewise contains an *a priori* principle for itself, and, since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire (whether, as in the case of the lower faculty of desire, it precedes the principle of that faculty or, as in the case of the upper, it follows only from the determination of that faculty through the moral law), it will likewise effect a transition from the pure faculty of cognition, i.e., from the domain of the concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason.

Thus even if philosophy can be divided into only two parts, the theoretical and the practical; even if everything that we might have to say about the proper principles of the power of judgment must be counted as belonging to the theoretical part, i.e., to rational cognition in accordance with concepts of nature; still, the critique of pure reason, which must constitute all this before undertaking that system, for the sake of its possibility, consists of three parts: the critique of the pure understanding, of the pure power of judgment, and of pure reason, which faculties are called pure because they are legislative *a priori*.

IV.

On the power of judgment as an *a priori* legislative faculty.

The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal.^a If the universal (the rule,

to their objects, which cannot be held back from striving to achieve their effect even by the consciousness of their inadequacy for it. – Why there is this tendency in our nature to consciously vain desires is an anthropological-teleological question. It appears that if we were not to be determined to the application of our powers until we had assured ourselves of the adequacy of our faculties for the production of an object, then these powers would remain largely unemployed. For ordinarily we learn to know our powers only by first trying them out. This illusion in empty wishes is therefore only the consequence of a beneficent arrangement in our nature.

^a *dem Allgemeinen*. In this section, the term *das Allgemeine* is frequently used as a nominative, which can only be translated as “the universal,” and the adjective *allgemein* will

the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it (even when, as a transcendental power of judgment, it provides the conditions *a priori* in accordance with which alone anything can be subsumed under that universal), is **determining**. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely **reflecting**.⁶

The determining power of judgment under universal transcendental laws, given by the understanding, merely subsumes; the law is sketched out for it *a priori*, and it is therefore unnecessary for it to think of a law for itself in order to be able to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal. – But there is such a manifold of forms in nature, as it were so many modifications of the universal transcendental concepts of nature that are left undetermined by those laws that the pure understanding gives *a priori*, since these pertain only to the possibility of a nature (as object of the senses) in general, that there must nevertheless also be laws for it which, as empirical, may seem to be contingent in accordance with the insight of **our** understanding, but which, if they are to be called laws (as is also required by the concept of a nature), must be regarded as necessary on a principle of the unity of the manifold, even if that principle is unknown to us.⁷ – The reflecting power of judgment, which is under the obligation of ascending from the particular in nature to the universal, therefore requires a principle that it cannot borrow from experience, precisely because it is supposed to ground the unity of all empirical principles under equally empirical but higher principles, and is thus to ground the possibility of the systematic subordination of empirical principles under one another. The reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere else (for then it would be the determining power of judgment), nor can it prescribe it to nature: for reflection on the laws of nature is directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the conditions in terms of which we attempt to develop a concept of it that is in this regard entirely contingent.

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Now this principle can be nothing other than this: that since universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature (although only in accordance with the universal concept of it as nature), the particular empirical laws, in regard to that which is left undetermined in them by the former, must be considered in terms of the sort of unity they would have if an understanding (even if not ours) had likewise given them for the sake of our faculty of cognition, in order to make possible a system of experience

correspondingly be translated as “universal” rather than “general” in this and the following sections of the Introduction unless otherwise noted.

in accordance with particular laws of nature. Not as if in this way such an understanding must really be assumed (for it is only the reflecting power of judgment for which this idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for determining); rather this faculty thereby gives a law only to itself, and not to nature.⁸

5: 181 Now since the concept of an object insofar as it at the same time contains the ground of the reality of this object is called an **end**, and the correspondence of a thing with that constitution of things that is possible only in accordance with ends is called the **purposiveness** of its form, thus the principle of the power of judgment in regard to the form of things in nature under empirical laws in general is the **purposiveness of nature** in its multiplicity. I.e., nature is represented through this concept as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.

The purposiveness of nature is thus a special *a priori* concept that has its origin strictly in the reflecting power of judgment. For we cannot ascribe to the products of nature anything like a relation of nature in them to ends, but can only use this concept in order to reflect on the connection of appearances in nature that are given in accordance with empirical laws.⁹ This concept is also entirely distinct from that of practical purposiveness (of human art as well as of morals), although it is certainly conceived of in terms of an analogy with that.

V.

The principle of the formal purposiveness
of nature is a transcendental principle
of the power of judgment.

A transcendental principle is one through which the universal *a priori* condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition at all is represented. By contrast, a principle is called metaphysical if it represents the *a priori* condition under which alone objects whose concept must be given empirically can be further determined *a priori*. Thus the principle of the cognition of bodies as substances and as alterable substances is transcendental if what is meant by that is that their alteration must have a cause; it is metaphysical, however, if what is meant by that is that their alteration must have an **external** cause: for in the first case the body may be conceived of only through ontological predicates (pure concepts of the understanding), e.g., as substance, in order for the proposition to be cognized *a priori*; in the second case, however, the empirical concept of a body (as a movable thing in space) must be made the ground of this proposition, from which, however, it can then be understood fully *a priori* that the latter predicate (of motion only through an external cause) applies to the

body.¹⁰ – Thus, as I shall show forthwith, the principle of the purposiveness of nature (in the multiplicity of its empirical laws) is a transcendental principle. For the concept of the objects insofar as they are thought as standing under this principle is only the pure concept of objects of possible experiential cognition in general, and contains nothing empirical. By contrast, the principle of practical purposiveness which must be conceived of in the idea of the **determination** of a free **will** would be a metaphysical principle, because the concept of a faculty of desire as a will must still be given empirically (it does not belong among the transcendental predicates). Both principles are nevertheless not empirical but *a priori* principles, because the combination of the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their judgments requires no further experience, but can be understood entirely *a priori*.

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That the concept of a purposiveness of nature belongs among the transcendental principles can readily be seen from the maxims of the power of judgment, which are laid down *a priori* as the basis for research into nature, but which nevertheless pertain to nothing other than the possibility of experience, hence of the cognition of nature, but not merely as nature in general, but rather as nature as determined by a manifold of particular laws. – They are to be found often enough in the course of this science, but only scattered about, as pronouncements of metaphysical wisdom, on the occasion of various rules whose necessity cannot be demonstrated from concepts. “Nature takes the shortest way” (*lex parsimoniae*);^a “it makes no leaps, either in the sequence of its changes or in the juxtaposition of specifically different forms” (*lex continui in natura*);^b “the great multiplicity of its empirical laws is nevertheless unity under a few principles” (*principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda*);^c and so on.¹¹

However, if one wants to give the origin of these fundamental principles and attempts to do so in a psychological way, this is entirely contrary to their sense. For they do not say what happens, i.e., in accordance with which rule our powers of cognition actually perform their role and how things are judged, but rather how they ought to be judged;^d and this logical objective necessity is not forthcoming if the principles are merely empirical. Thus the purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties and for their use, which is obvious in them, is a transcendental principle of judgments and therefore also requires a transcendental deduction, by means of which the ground for judging in this way must be sought in the sources of cognition *a priori*.

^a the law of parsimony

^b law of continuity in nature

^c principles are not to be multiplied beyond necessity

^d nicht . . . wie geurteilt wird, sondern wie geurteilt werden soll

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That is, we first find in the grounds of the possibility of an experience something necessary, namely the universal laws without which nature in general (as object of the senses) could not be conceived; and these rest on the categories, applied to the formal conditions of all intuition that is possible for us, insofar as it is likewise given to us *a priori*.^a Now under these laws the power of judgment is determining, for it has nothing to do but subsume under given laws. E.g., the understanding says: All alteration has its cause (universal law of nature); now the transcendental power of judgment has nothing further to do than to provide the condition of subsumption under the *a priori* concept of the understanding that has been laid down for it: and that is the succession of the determinations of one and the same thing.¹² Now for nature in general (as the object of possible experience) that law is cognized as absolutely necessary. – Now, however, the objects of empirical cognition are still determined or, as far as one can judge *a priori*, determinable in so many ways apart from that formal time-condition that specifically distinct natures, besides what they have in common as belonging to nature in general, can still be causes in infinitely many ways; and each of these ways must (in accordance with the concept of a cause in general) have its rule, which is a law, and hence brings necessity with it, although given the constitution and the limits of our faculties of cognition we have no insight at all into this necessity. Thus we must think of there being in nature, with regard to its merely empirical laws, a possibility of infinitely manifold empirical laws, which as far as our insight goes are nevertheless contingent (cannot be cognized *a priori*); and with regard to them we judge^b the unity of nature in accordance with empirical laws and the possibility of the unity of experience (as a system in accordance with empirical laws) as contingent.¹³ But since such a unity must still necessarily be presupposed and assumed, for otherwise no thoroughgoing interconnection of empirical cognitions into a whole of experience would take place, because the universal laws of nature yield such an interconnection among things with respect to their genera, as things of nature in general, but not specifically, as such and such particular beings in nature, the power of judgment must thus assume it as an *a priori* principle for its own use that what is contingent for human insight in the particular (empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a lawful unity, not fathomable by us but still thinkable, in the combination of its manifold into one experience possible in itself. Consequently, since the lawful unity in a combination that we cognize as in accordance with a necessary aim (a

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^a In the first edition, there is a comma rather than a period here, and the next sentence is a further clause of this one, introduced with an “and.”

^b *beurtheilen*

need) of the understanding but yet at the same time as contingent in itself is represented as a purposiveness of the objects (in this case, of nature), thus the power of judgment, which with regard to things under possible (still to be discovered) empirical laws is merely reflecting, must think of nature with regard to the latter in accordance with a **principle of purposiveness** for our faculty of cognition, which is then expressed in the maxims of the power of judgment given above. Now this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to the object (of nature), but rather only represents the unique way in which we must proceed in reflection on the objects of nature with the aim of a thoroughly interconnected experience, consequently it is a subjective principle (maxim) of the power of judgment; hence we are also delighted (strictly speaking, relieved of a need) when we encounter such a systematic unity among merely empirical laws, just as if it were a happy accident which happened to favor our aim, even though we necessarily had to assume that there is such a unity, yet without having been able to gain insight into it and to prove it.

In order to be convinced of the correctness of this deduction of the concept that is before us and of the necessity of assuming it as a transcendental principle of cognition, one need only consider the magnitude of the task of making an interconnected experience out of given perceptions of a nature that in the worst case contains an infinite multiplicity of empirical laws, a task that lies in our understanding *a priori*. The understanding is of course in possession *a priori* of universal laws of nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience at all; but still it requires in addition a certain order of nature in its particular rules, which can only be known to it empirically and which from its point of view are contingent. These rules, without which there would be no progress from the general^a analogy of a possible experience in general to the particular, it must think as laws (i.e., as necessary), because otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature, even though it does not and never can cognize their necessity. Thus although it cannot determine anything *a priori* with regard to those (objects), it must yet, in order to investigate these empirical so-called laws, ground all reflection on nature on an *a priori* principle, the principle, namely, that in accordance with these laws a cognizable order of nature is possible – the sort of principle that is expressed in the following propositions: that there is in nature a subordination of genera and species that we can grasp; that the latter in turn converge in accordance with a common principle, so that a tran-

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^a *allgemeinen*

sition from one to the other and thereby to a higher genus is possible; that since it seems initially unavoidable for our understanding to have to assume as many different kinds of causality as there are specific differences of natural effects, they may nevertheless stand under a small number of principles with the discovery of which we have to occupy ourselves, etc.¹⁴ This agreement of nature with our faculty of cognition is presupposed *a priori* by the power of judgment in behalf of its reflection on nature in accordance with empirical laws, while at the same time the understanding recognizes it objectively as contingent, and only the power of judgment attributes it to nature as transcendental purposiveness (in relation to the cognitive faculty of the subject): because without presupposing this, we would have no order of nature in accordance with empirical laws, hence no guideline for an experience of this in all its multiplicity and for research into it.

For it may certainly be thought that, in spite of all the uniformity of things in nature in accordance with the universal laws, without which the form of an experiential cognition in general would not obtain at all, the specific diversity of the empirical laws of nature together with their effects could nevertheless be so great that it would be impossible for our understanding to discover in them an order that we can grasp, to divide its products into genera and species in order to use the principles for the explanation and the understanding of one for the explanation and comprehension of the other as well, and to make an interconnected experience out of material that is for us so confused (strictly speaking, only infinitely manifold and not fitted for our power of comprehension).

5: 186 The power of judgment thus also has in itself an *a priori* principle for the possibility of nature, though only in a subjective respect, by means of which it prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy) for reflection on nature, which one could call the **law of the specification of nature** with regard to its empirical laws, which it does not cognize in nature *a priori* but rather assumes in behalf of an order of nature cognizable for our understanding in the division that it makes of its universal laws when it would subordinate a manifold of particular laws to these.¹⁵ Thus if one says that nature specifies its universal laws in accordance with the principle of purposiveness for our faculty of cognition, i.e., into suitability for human understanding in its necessary business of finding the universal for the particular that is offered to it by perception and then further connection in the unity of the principle for all that is different (though universal for each species), then one is thereby neither prescribing a law to nature nor learning one from it by means of observation (although that principle can be confirmed by the latter). For it is not a principle of the determining but rather merely of the reflecting power

of judgment; one means only that, however nature may be arranged as far as its universal laws are concerned, we must always seek out its empirical laws in accordance with that principle and the maxims that are grounded on it, because only so far as that takes place can we make progress in experience and acquire cognition by the use of our understanding.

VI.

On the combination of the feeling of pleasure
with the concept of the purposiveness of
nature.

This correspondence of nature in the multiplicity of its particular laws with our need to find universality of principles for it must be judged,^a as far as our insight goes, as contingent but nevertheless indispensable for the needs of our understanding, and hence as a purposiveness through which nature agrees with our aim, but only as directed to cognition. – The universal laws of the understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are equally as necessary to it (though they have originated from spontaneity) as the laws of motion are to matter; and their generation presupposes no intention with regard to our faculty of cognition, since only through them do we first obtain a concept of what cognition of things (of nature) is, and they necessarily pertain to nature as object of our cognition in general. Yet that the order of nature in its particular laws, although its multiplicity and diversity at least possibly surpass all our power of comprehension, is yet fitted to it, is, as far as we can see, contingent; and its discovery is a task for the understanding, which is aimed at an end that is necessary for it, namely to introduce into it unity of principles – which purpose must be attributed to nature by the power of judgment, because the understanding cannot prescribe to it any law on this matter.

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The attainment of every aim is combined with the feeling of pleasure; and, if the condition of the former is an *a priori* representation, as in this case a principle for the reflecting power of judgment in general, then the feeling of pleasure is also determined through a ground that is *a priori* and valid for everyone; and indeed merely through the relation of the object to the faculty of cognition, without the concept of purposiveness in this case having the least regard to the faculty of desire, and thus being entirely distinct from any practical purposiveness of nature.

In fact, although in the concurrence of perceptions with laws in

^a *beurtheilt*

accordance with universal concepts of nature (the categories) we do not encounter the least effect on the feeling of pleasure in us nor can encounter it, because here the understanding proceeds unintentionally, in accordance with its nature, by contrast the discovered unifiability of two or more empirically heterogeneous laws of nature under a principle that comprehends them both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure, often indeed of admiration, even of one which does not cease though one is already sufficiently familiar with its object. To be sure, we no longer detect any noticeable pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and the unity of its division into genera and species, by means of which alone empirical concepts are possible through which we cognize it in its particular laws; but it must certainly have been there in its time, and only because the most common experience would not be possible without it has it gradually become mixed up with mere cognition and is no longer specially noticed. – It thus requires study to make us attentive to the purposiveness of nature for our understanding in our judging^a of it, where possible bringing heterogeneous laws of nature under higher though always still empirical ones, so that if we succeed in this accord of such laws for our faculty of cognition, which we regard as merely contingent, pleasure will be felt.¹⁶ Conversely, a representation of nature that foretold that even in the most minor investigation of the most common experience we would stumble on a heterogeneity in its laws that would make the unification of its particular laws under universal empirical ones impossible for our understanding would thoroughly displease us; because this would contradict the principle of the subjective-purposive specification of nature in its genera and our reflecting power of judgment with respect to the latter.

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This presupposition of the power of judgment is, however, so indeterminate on the question of how far that ideal purposiveness of nature for our faculty of cognition should be extended that if someone were to tell us that a deeper or more extensive acquaintance with nature through observation must finally stumble upon a multiplicity of laws that no human understanding can trace back to one principle, we would be content with this, although we would rather listen if another gives us hope that the more we become acquainted with what is innermost in nature or could compare it with external members as yet unknown to us, the simpler and more perspicuous would we find it in the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws the farther our experience progressed. For it is a command of our power of judgment to proceed in accordance with the principle of the suitability of nature to our faculty of cognition as far as it reaches, without (since it is not a

^a *Beurteilung*

determining power of judgment that gives us this rule) deciding whether or not it somewhere has its boundaries: because we can certainly determine boundaries with regard to the rational use of our cognitive faculties, but in the empirical field no determination of boundaries is possible.

VII.

On the aesthetic representation of the purposiveness of nature.

What is merely subjective in the representation of an object, i.e., what constitutes its relation to the subject, not to the object, is its aesthetic property; but that in it which serves for the determination of the object (for cognition) or can be so used is its logical validity. In the cognition of an object of the senses both relations are present together. In the sensible representation of things outside me the quality of the space in which we intuit them is the merely subjective aspect of my representation of them (through which what they might be as objects in themselves remains undetermined), on account of which relation the object is also thereby thought of merely as appearance; space, however, in spite of its merely subjective quality, is nevertheless an element in the cognition of things as appearances. **Sensation** (in this case external) likewise expresses the merely subjective aspect of our representations of things outside us, but strictly speaking it expresses the material (the real) in them (through which something existing is given), just as space expresses the mere *a priori* form of the possibility of their intuition; and the former is likewise used for the cognition of objects outside us.

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However, the subjective aspect in a representation **which cannot become an element of cognition at all** is the **pleasure or displeasure** connected with it; for through this I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it can well be the effect of some cognition or other.¹⁷ Now the purposiveness of a thing, insofar as it is represented in perception, is also not a property of the object itself (for such a thing cannot be perceived), although it can be derived from a cognition of things. Thus the purposiveness that precedes the cognition of an object, which is immediately connected with it even without wanting to use the representation of it for a cognition, is the subjective aspect of it that cannot become an element of cognition at all. The object is therefore called purposive in this case only because its representation is immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure; and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the purposiveness. – The question is only whether there is such a representation of purposiveness at all.

If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension (*apprehensio*) of

5: 190 the form of an object of intuition without a relation of this to a concept for a determinate cognition, then the representation is thereby related not to the object, but solely to the subject, and the pleasure can express nothing but its suitability to the cognitive faculties that are in play in the reflecting power of judgment, insofar as they are in play, and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the object.¹⁸ For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflecting power of judgment, even if unintentionally, at least comparing them to its faculty for relating intuitions to concepts. Now if in this comparison the imagination (as the faculty of *a priori* intuitions) is unintentionally brought into accord with the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, through a given representation and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as purposive for the reflecting power of judgment. Such a judgment is an aesthetic judgment on the purposiveness of the object, which is not grounded on any available concept of the object and does not furnish one. That object the form^a of which (not the material aspect of its representation, as sensation) in mere reflection on it (without any intention of acquiring a concept from it) is judged^b as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object – with its representation this pleasure is also judged to be necessarily combined, consequently not merely for the subject who apprehends this form but for everyone who judges at all. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty for judging through such a pleasure (consequently also with universal validity) is called taste. For since the ground of the pleasure is placed merely in the form of the object for reflection in general, hence not in any sensation of the object and also without relation to a concept that contains any intention, it is only the lawfulness in the empirical use of the power of judgment in general (unity of imagination with the understanding) in the subject with which the representation of the object in reflection, whose *a priori* conditions are universally valid, agrees; and, since this agreement of the object with the faculties of the subjective is contingent, it produces the representation of a purposiveness of the object with regard to the cognitive faculties of the subject.

5: 191 Now here is a pleasure which, like all pleasure or displeasure which is not produced through the concept of freedom (i.e., through the antecedent determination of the higher faculty of desire through pure reason), can never be understood through concepts to be necessarily combined with the representation of an object, but must always be cognized to be connected with this only through reflected perception,

^a In the first edition, “An object whose form . . .”

^b *beurtheilt*

and consequently, like all empirical judgments, cannot promise any objective necessity and make a claim to *a priori* validity. But the judgment of taste, like every other empirical judgment, also only makes a claim to be valid for everyone, which, in spite of its intrinsic contingency, is always possible. What is strange and anomalous is only this: that it is not an empirical concept but rather a feeling of pleasure (consequently not a concept at all) which, through the judgment of taste, is nevertheless to be expected of everyone^a and connected with its representation, just as if it were a predicate associated with the cognition of the object.

An individual judgment of experience, e.g., one made by someone who perceives a mobile droplet of water in a rock crystal, rightly demands that anyone else must also find it so, since he has made this judgment, in accordance with the general conditions of the determining power of judgment, under the laws of a possible experience in general. In just the same way, someone who feels pleasure in mere reflection on the form of an object, without regard to a concept, rightly makes claim to the assent of everyone else, even though this judgment is empirical and is an individual judgment, since the ground for this pleasure is to be found in the universal though subjective condition of reflecting judgments, namely the purposive correspondence of an object (be it a product of nature or of art) with the relationship^b of the cognitive faculties among themselves (of the imagination and the understanding) that is required for every empirical cognition. The pleasure in the judgment of taste is therefore certainly dependent on an empirical representation, and cannot be associated *a priori* with any concept (one cannot determine *a priori* which object will or will not suit taste, one must try it out); but it is nevertheless the determining ground of this judgment only in virtue of the fact that one is aware that it rests merely on reflection and on the general although only subjective conditions of its correspondence for the cognition of objects in general, for which the form of the object is purposive.

That is the reason why judgments of taste are also subject to a critique with regard to their possibility, since this presupposes an *a priori* principle, though this principle is neither a cognitive principle for the understanding nor a practical principle for the will, and thus is not *a priori* determining at all.

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The susceptibility to a pleasure from reflection on the form of things (of nature as well as art), however, indicates not only a purposiveness of objects in relation to the reflecting power of judgment, in

^a *jedermann zugemuthet*; the verb *zumuthen* will generally be translated as “expect of [someone],” while *erwarten* will be translated simply as “expect [that].”

^b *Verhältnis*

accordance with the concept of nature, in the subject, but also, conversely, one of the subject, due to the concept of freedom, with regard to the objects, concerning their form or even their lack of form; and thereby it happens that the aesthetic judgment is related not only to the beautiful, merely as judgment of taste, but also, as one that has arisen from a feeling of spirit,^a to the **sublime**, and thus the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment must be divided into two principal parts corresponding to this distinction.¹⁹

VIII.

On the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature.

In an object given in experience purposiveness can be represented either on a merely subjective ground, as a correspondence of its form in its **apprehension** (*apprehensio*) prior to any concept with the faculties of cognition, in order to unite the intuition with concepts for a cognition in general, or on an objective ground, as a correspondence of its form with the possibility of the thing itself, in accordance with a concept of it which precedes and contains the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of the first sort of purposiveness rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in mere reflection on it; thus the representation of the second kind of purposiveness, since it relates the form of the object not to the cognitive faculties of the subject in the apprehension of it but to a determinate cognition of the object under a given concept, has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things but rather with the understanding in judging^b them. If the concept of an object is given, then the business of the power of judgment in using it for cognition consists in **presentation** (*exhibitio*), i.e., in placing a corresponding intuition beside the concept – whether this be done through our own imagination, as in art, when we realize an antecedently conceived concept of an object that is an end for us, or through nature, in its technique (as in the case of organized bodies), when we ascribe to it our concept of an end for judging^c its product, in which case what is represented is not merely a **purposiveness** of nature in the form of the thing, but this product of it is represented as a **natural end**. – Although our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms, in accordance with empirical laws, is not a concept of the object at all, but only a principle of the power of judgment for providing concepts in the face of this excessive multiplicity in nature

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^a *Geistesgefühl*^b *Beurtheilung*^c *Beurtheilung*

(in order to be able to be oriented in it), we nevertheless hereby ascribe to it as it were a regard to our faculty of cognition, in accordance with the analogy of an end; and thus we can regard **natural beauty** as the **presentation** of the concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness and **natural ends** as the presentation of the concept of a real (objective) purposiveness, one of which we judge^a through taste (aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure), the other through understanding and reason (logically, in accordance with concepts).

On this is grounded the division of the critique of the power of judgment into that of the **aesthetic** and **teleological** power of judgment; by the former is meant the faculty for judging^b formal purposiveness (also called subjective) through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, by the latter the faculty for judging the real purposiveness (objective) of nature through understanding and reason.

In a critique of the power of judgment the part that contains the aesthetic power of judgment is essential, since this alone contains a principle that the power of judgment lays at the basis of its reflection on nature entirely *a priori*, namely that of a formal purposiveness of nature in accordance with its particular (empirical) laws for our faculty of cognition, without which the understanding could not find itself in it; whereas no *a priori* ground at all can be given why there must be objective ends of nature, i.e., things that are possible only as natural ends, indeed not even the possibility of such things is obvious from the concept of a nature as an object of experience in general as well as in particular; rather the power of judgment, without containing a principle for this in itself *a priori*, in order to make use of the concept of ends in behalf of reason, merely contains in some cases that come before it (certain products) the rule by which that transcendental principle has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of an end (at least as far as form is concerned) to nature.

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The fundamental transcendental principle, however, for representing a purposiveness of nature in subjective relation to our faculty of cognition in the form of a thing as a principle for judging^c it leaves it entirely undetermined where and in which cases I have to undertake the judging^d of this form as that of a product in accordance with a principle of purposiveness and not rather merely in accordance with general laws of nature, and leaves it to the **aesthetic** power of judgment to make out, in taste, the suitability of the thing (of its form) to our cognitive faculties (insofar as these decide not through correspon-

^a *beurtheilen*

^b Here and in the next clause: *beurtheilen*.

^c *Beurteilung*

^d *Beurteilung*

dence with concepts but through feeling). By contrast, the teleologically employed power of judgment provides the determinate conditions under which something (e.g., an organized body), is to be judged^a in accordance with the idea of an end of nature; but it cannot adduce any fundamental principle from the concept of nature, as object of experience, that would warrant ascribing to it *a priori* a relation to ends or even warrant merely indeterminately assuming anything of the sort about the actual experience of such products: the reason for which is that many particular experiences must be arranged and considered under the unity of their principle in order to be able to cognize even empirically an objective purposiveness in a particular object. – The aesthetic power of judgment is thus a special faculty for judging^b things in accordance with a rule but not in accordance with concepts. The teleological power of judgment is not a special faculty, but only the reflecting power of judgment in general, insofar as it proceeds in accordance with concepts, as is always the case in theoretical cognitions, but, with regard to certain objects in nature, in accordance with particular principles, namely those of a power of judgment that is merely reflecting and is not determining objects; thus as far as its application is concerned it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy, and on account of its special principles, which are not determining, as must be the case in a doctrine, must also constitute a special part of the critique; whereas the aesthetic power of judgment contributes nothing to the cognition of its objects and thus must be counted **only** as part of the critique of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties, insofar as these are capable of *a priori* principles, whatever their use (theoretical or practical) might otherwise be, which is the propaedeutic of all philosophy.

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IX.

On the connection of the legislations
of understanding and reason through
the power of judgment.

The understanding legislates *a priori* for nature, as object of the senses, for a theoretical cognition of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates *a priori* for freedom and its own causality, as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical cognition. The domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely barred from any mutual influence that they could have on each other by themselves (each in accor-

^a zu beurtheilen sei^b zu beurtheilen

dance with its fundamental laws) by the great chasm that separates the supersensible from the appearances. The concept of freedom determines nothing in regard to the theoretical cognition of nature; the concept of nature likewise determines nothing in regard to the practical laws of freedom: and it is to this extent not possible to throw a bridge from one domain to the other. – But although the determining grounds of causality in accordance with the concept of freedom (and the practical rules that it contains) are not found in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, nevertheless the converse is possible (not in regard to the cognition of nature, of course, but in regard to the consequences of the former on the latter) and is already contained in the concept of a causality through freedom, whose **effect** in accordance with its formal laws is to take place in the world, although the word **cause**, when used of the supersensible, signifies only the **ground** for determining the causality of natural things to an effect that is in accord with their^a own natural laws but yet at the same time is also in unison with the formal principle of the laws of reason, the possibility of which cannot of course be understood, although the objection that there is an alleged contradiction in it can be adequately refuted.* – The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end, which (or its appearance in the sensible world) should exist, for which the condition of its possibility in nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible being, that is, as a human being) is presupposed. That which presupposes this *a priori* and without regard to the practical, namely, the power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely

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* One of the various alleged contradictions in this whole distinction between the causality of nature and that through freedom is that which objects that if I speak of the **hindrances** that nature lays in the way of causality through the laws of freedom (the moral laws) or of its **promotion** of this causality, I still concede an **influence** of the former on the latter. But if one would simply understand what has been said, this misinterpretation can very easily be avoided. The resistance or the promotion is not between nature and freedom, but between the former as appearance and the **effects** of the latter as appearances in the sensible world; and even the causality of freedom (of pure and^b practical reason) is the causality of a natural cause (of the subject, as a human being, thus considered as an appearance) subordinated to the former, the ground of the **determination** of which is contained in the intelligible that is thought under freedom, in a way that is otherwise inexplicable (just as is that which constitutes the supersensible substrate of nature).

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^a In the first edition, “these their . . .”

^b The word “and” was added in the second edition.

practical, from lawfulness in accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the latter, in the concept of a **purposiveness** of nature; for thereby is the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in accord with its laws, cognized.

Through the possibility of its *a priori* laws for nature the understanding gives a proof that nature is cognized by us only as appearance, and hence at the same time an indication of its supersensible substratum; but it leaves this entirely **undetermined**. The power of judgment, through its *a priori* principle for judging^a nature in accordance with possible particular laws for it, provides for its supersensible substratum (in us as well as outside us) **determinability through the intellectual faculty**. But reason provides **determination** for the same substratum through its practical law *a priori*; and thus the power of judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.

5: 197 In regard to the faculties of the soul in general, insofar as they are considered as higher faculties, i.e., as ones that contain an autonomy, the understanding is the one that contains the **constitutive** principles *a priori* for the **faculty of cognition** (the theoretical cognition of nature); for the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure** it is the power of judgment, independent of concepts and sensations that are related to the determination of the faculty of desire and could thereby be immediately practical; for the **faculty of desire** it is reason, which is practical without the mediation of any sort of pleasure, wherever it might come from, and determines for this faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end, which at the same time brings with it the pure intellectual satisfaction in the object. – The power of judgment's concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs among the concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition, although the aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art) that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The spontaneity in the play of the faculties of cognition, the agreement of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with the concept of freedom in its consequences, in that the latter at the same time promotes the receptivity of the mind for the moral feeling. – The following table can facilitate the overview of all the higher faculties in accordance with their systematic unity.*

5: 197 * It has been thought suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy almost always turn out to be threefold. But that is in the nature of the matter. If a division is to be made *a priori*, then it will either be **analytic**, in accordance

^a *der Beurteilung*

All the faculties of the mind	Faculty of cognition	<i>A priori</i> principles	Application to
Faculty of cognition	Understanding	Lawfulness	Nature
Feeling of pleasure and displeasure	Power of judgment	Purposiveness	Art
Faculty of desire	Reason	Final end	Freedom

with the principle of contradiction, and then it is always twofold (*quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A^a*). Or it is **synthetic**; and if in this case it is to be derived from **concepts a priori** (not, as in mathematics, from the *a priori* intuition corresponding to the concept), then, in accordance with what is requisite for synthetic unity in general, namely (1) a condition, (2) something conditioned, (3) the concept that arises from the unification of the conditioned with its condition, the division must necessarily be a trichotomy.

^a “Anything is either A or not A.”

This entirely new translation of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. This volume includes for the first time the first draft of Kant's introduction to the work; the only English edition notes to the many differences between the first (1790) and second (1793) editions of the work; and relevant passages in Kant's anthropology lectures where he elaborated on his aesthetic views. This entirely new translation of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. This volume includes for the first time the first draft of Kant's introduction to the work; the only English edition notes to the many differences between the first (1790) and second This entirely new translation of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of. Mistakes in the choice of metric are also far more difficult to detect because they involve judgmental not technical lapses. The Critique of the Power of Judgment (a more accurate rendition of what has hitherto been translated as the Critique of Judgment) is the third of Kant's great critiques following the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. This translation of Kant's masterpiece follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgment. 285. Method of citation and abbreviations. Cambridge Core - Philosophy Texts - Critique of the Power of Judgment. Douzinas, Costas McVeigh, Shaun and Warrington, Ronnie 1992. The Alta(e)rs of Law: The Judgement of Legal Aesthetics. Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 9, Issue. 4, p. 93.