

University of Toronto
Department of History

JHP 1631S:
Intelligence and International Relations

Spring 2012

Professor Wesley K. Wark

Seminar Meets: TUESDAY, 12-2, LA 213

Prof Wark's Office: Munk 311N

Office Hours: TUESDAY 2:30 to 3:30 or by appointment

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Instructor's Bio:

Wesley Wark is a professor in the History department at the University of Toronto, and a faculty member of the Munk School of Global Affairs. He is Past-President of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (1998-2000 and 2004-2006).

His most recent book is Secret Intelligence: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2009). He is currently writing a history of modern intelligence.

Professor Wark is a frequent media commentator on national security and intelligence issues. He served for two terms on the Prime Minister's Advisory Council on National Security (2005-2009) and served from 2006 until 2010 on the Canada Border Services Agency Advisory Committee.

Course Outline

This course is designed to explore the phenomenon of intelligence power in the modern era. We will examine, through selected case studies, the evolution of intelligence and its impact on the conduct of international relations from the dawn of the Cold War to the present. These case studies will focus heavily on the performance of US intelligence, as the leading intelligence power in the post WW2 era. The US focus will also allow the seminar to take advantage of major documentary sources available on the internet.

Attention will be paid to analysis of the fundamental problems of translating information into knowledge for decision-making in the international arena, with special emphasis on the literature on intelligence analysis and the root causes of analytical failure. Research using primary source material will be an important component of the seminar.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

Participation: Students in the seminar will be expected to attend all sessions and to do all the readings listed. If you cannot attend a particular class owing to ill health or other emergency, please inform Professor Wark in advance. Seminar participation is worth **20%** of the overall grade. This mark is based on the quality of student contributions to the seminar.

Seminar Presentation: Each student will deliver ONE seminar presentation, designed to introduce the topic and readings for a particular week's discussion. The presentation should briefly summarise the material and critically highlight and analyse key issues for debate by the seminar. A five page written paper, from which your oral presentation will be drawn, must be submitted on the day of your presentation. The seminar presentation is worth **20%** of the overall mark. **Due date TBA.**

Essay topic and preliminary bibliography: For this exercise students will identify the topic they have chosen for their major essay, explain their choice and discuss the significance of the topic in brief paper of one to two pages. A preliminary bibliography must be attached, listing at least SIX sources, which may include articles, essays and books. At least ONE significant primary source document must be included in the assignment. The essay topic and bibliography assignment is worth **10%** of the overall mark. **Due Tuesday February 7 in class.**

Major Essay: A substantial essay on a topic of the student's choice, usually drawn from, or related to, one of the subjects covered in our weekly seminars. The essay should be c. 20 pages in length and show in-depth knowledge of the subject. It is expected that primary sources will be used to the greatest extent possible. The major essay is worth **50%** of the overall grade. **Due Tuesday, March 20, in class.**

** PLEASE NOTE THAT LATE WORK IS NOT ACCEPTED.

COURSE TEXTS: *(Available for purchase from the University of Toronto Bookstore)*

Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich and Wesley Wark, eds., Secret Intelligence: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2009) Paperback edition.

Peter Gill and Mark Pythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), Paperback edition.

Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010)

SEMINAR SCHEDULE

Wk. 1, Tuesday, Jan. 10: **Course Intro**

Wk. 2: Tuesday, Jan. 17: *Class cancelled*

Wk. 3, Tuesday, Jan. 24: **Intelligence Principles**

Required Reading:

Gill and Pythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Chapters 1 – 6 (pp. 1-124)

Secret Intelligence: A Reader, “Introduction: What is Intelligence,” pp. 1-18 (Essays by Warner and Davies);

Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails (Cornell University Press, 2010), ch. 4, pp. 156-196

Malcolm Gladwell, “Connecting the Dots: the Paradoxes of Intelligence Reform,” The New Yorker, March 10, 2003, pp. 83-88. Available online at:
www.gladwell.com/2003/2003_03_10_a_dots.html

Suggested Reading:

Australia, Report of the Enquiry into the Australian Intelligence Agencies (Flood Report), Chapter 2, Australia’s Intelligence Needs
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/index.htm)

Len Scott and Peter Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” Intelligence and National Security, 19, summer 2004, no. 2, pp. 139-69

Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapters 1-3

Mark M. Lowenthal, Chapter 1, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th edition (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009,)

Alan Dupont, “Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century,” in Wesley K. Wark, ed., Twenty-First Century Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2005)

Richard A. Posner, “The Principles of Intelligence,” ch. 4 of Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 (NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 99-125

Wk. 4, Tuesday, Jan 31:

Intelligence assessments and the Soviet Threat at the Dawn of the Cold War

Required Reading:

Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds. Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, chapters 1 and 5 (Steury and Garthoff), available online at:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/index.html>

Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed. Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Years of the Cold War, Preface + Docs # 4,12,69, 97, 132, 140, 145, 150, 165, 177 [available online at

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/index.html>

“X” (Keenan, G.F.), “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 25, July, 1947. This article is based on Keenan’s famous “long telegram” of February 22, 1946. The actual declassified text of the long telegram makes fascinating reading and may be found on the site of the Cold War History Project at:

<http://www.coldwarfiles.org/files/Documents/Kennantelegram.pdf>

NSC 68, April 7, 1950, is a penetrating analysis of the emerging Cold War situation which has now been declassified. It is available at:

<http://www.coldwarfiles.org/files/Documents/nsc68.pdf>

Suggested Reading:

Ernest R. May, ed. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, Introduction, “NSC 68: The Theory and Politics of Strategy” also reprints NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950”

Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, chapters on Truman and Eisenhower (5 and 6)

Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 2nd edition, chapters 1-4 and 11.

John Prados, The Soviet Estimate, (Princeton University Press, 1986) chapters 1-8

John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford University Press, 1997), chapters 4 and 8.

David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (Yale University Press, 1994), chapters 6-14

Wk. 5, Tuesday, Feb. 7: **Cold War Covert Operations: From Iran to the Bay of Pigs**

**** *Essay topic and preliminary bibliography exercise due* ****

Required Reading:

Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in a Postwar World (NY: Basic Books, 1987), especially chs 1-3.

Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). Introduction and ch. 2, "A Perfect Failure."

Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup in Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 19 (1987)

Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs," Journal of Latin American Studies, 27 (February 1995), 37-42.

Peter Kornbluh, "The Ultrasensitive Bay of Pigs," May 3, 2000, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 29, available online at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB29/index.html>

James Risen, "Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran," New York Times, April 11, 2000

James Risen, "Word for Word/ABC's of Coup: Oh, What a Fine Plot we Hatched," New York Times, June 18, 2000.

Michael Warner, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair," Studies in Intelligence, Winter 98-99, available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art08.html

Suggested Reading:

Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford University Press, 1999)

Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (John Wiley and Sons, 2003)

Peter Kornbluh. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (NY: New Press, 1998), Introduction and Part 1 (The Inspector General's Report)

Trumbull Higgins, A Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs (NY: Norton, 1987)

Bruce Kuklick, "Review of Victims of Groupthink," Journal of American History, 60, no. 3 (Dec. 1973)

John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War Two (NY: William Morrow, 1996)

Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999)

Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1979)

Wk. 6, Tuesday, Feb. 14:

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Required Reading:

James G Blight. and David Welch, eds. Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Frank Cass, 1998); also published as a special issue of the journal Intelligence and National Security, 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1998)

David Welch, "Intelligence Assessment in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Queen's Quarterly, 100, no. 2 (Summer 1993). 421-37

Mary S. McAuliffe, ed. Cuban Missile Crisis (CIA: CIA History Staff, 1992), documents # 3-4,33-36,45,46-47,53, 61,64,68,74,110-112, available online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis1962.pdf>

Suggested Reading:

David T. Lindgren, Trust But Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2000), ch. 3, "The Caribbean Crisis"

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision (2nd edition)

Dino Brugioni. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991)

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997)

Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997)

Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), ch. 5.

Wk. 7, Tuesday, Feb. 21:

READING WEEK

Wk. 8, Tuesday, Feb. 28:

Vietnam Judgments

Required Reading:

Samuel A. Adams, “Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing with the Numbers—Statistics on Viet Cong Strength Ignored by the CIA,” Harper’s, 250-251 (May, July 1975), pp. 41-45, 62-73; 14-16

Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968 (CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), See “Episode 3, 1967-68: CIA, the Order of Battle Controversy, and the Tet Offensive,” pp. 85-141. Available on-line at:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-and-the-vietnam-policymakers-three-episodes-1962-1968/index.html>

James J. Wirtz, “Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War,” Political Science Quarterly, 106, no. 2 (Summer 1991), 239-63

George W. Allen, None So Blind: A Personal Account of Intelligence Failure in Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 2001)

Richard Helms, A Look Over my Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (NY: Random House, 2003), ch. 31, “Are the Lights on?”

Suggested Reading:

Ronnie E. Ford, Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise (London: Frank Cass, 1995)

C. Michael Hiam, Who the Hell are We Fighting: The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars (Steerforth Press, 2006)

John Prados, "The Warning that Left Something to Chance: Intelligence at Tet," in Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, eds., The Tet Offensive, 1968 (Greenwood Publishing, 1996)

James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991)

Wk 9, Tuesday, Mar. 6: Intelligence and the Fall of the Shah of Iran

Required reading:

Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010), ch. 2 "Failing to See that the Shah was in Danger" (pp. 15-108)

H-DIPLO Roundtable, online at
<http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Rountdable-XI-32.pdf>

Robert Wright, Our Man in Teheran: Ken Taylor, The CIA and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2010), ch. 14 "A Nest of Spies," pp. 222-240

Suggested Reading:

Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (NY, 1985)

Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Harvard University Press, 2004)

Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA (NY, 1987)

Gregory Treverton, "Iran 1978-79: Coping with the Unthinkable," in Ernest May and Philip Zelikov, eds., Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of US Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis 1945-1990 (MIT Press, 2006)

Ofira Seliktar, Failing the Crystal Ball Test: The Carter Administration and the Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran (Praeger, 2000)

Wk 10, Tuesday, Mar. 13: The Great Game and Afghanistan

Required Reading:

Milt Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," Foreign Affairs, 80, no. 6 (Nov/Dec. 2001), 17-30.

Douglas MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: the Intelligence Community's Record, (CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2002) available online at:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/index.html> (see 2002)

Charles G. Cogan, “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,” World Policy Journal, 10, no. 2 (Summer 1993), 73-82.

Kirsten Lundberg, “Politics of a Covert Action: The US, the Mujahideen, and the Stinger Missile,” Harvard University. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Case Study # 1546, available online at <http://www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/casetitle.asp?caseNo=1546.0>

Alan J. Kuperman, “The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan,” Political Science Quarterly, 114, no. 2 (Summer 1999), 219-63.

Odd Arne Westad, “Concerning the Situation in “A”: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” Woodrow Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996), pp. 128ff,

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See also in the same issue of the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, immediately following, “Documents from the Russian and East German Archives,”

Suggested Reading:

Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: the Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (NY: Random House, 2003), Part Two: “The Cold War Turns Hot in Afghanistan”

Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden (NY: Penguin Press, 2004)

George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003)

(for fun—the film version of “Charlie Wilson’s War”)

Cold War International History Project, Virtual Archive, “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.”

Wk 11, Tuesday, Mar. 20:

The Fall of the Soviet Union: Who Knew?

Required Reading:

Fischer, Benjamin B., ed., At Cold War’s End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991, Preface, plus documents 1-7

Available on-line at:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/at-cold-wars-end-us-intelligence-on-the-soviet-union-and-eastern-europe-1989-1991/art-1.html>

MacEachin, Douglas, "CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges," (1996) Available on-line at:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-assessments-of-the-soviet-union-the-record-versus-the-charges/3496toc.html>

Goodman, Melvin, "Ending the CIA's Cold War Legacy," Foreign Policy, 106 (Spring 1997)

Powers, Thomas, "Who Won the Cold War?," in Powers, Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al Qaeda [also appeared in New York Review of Books, June 20, 1996] (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004)

Suggested Reading:

Andrew, Christopher. For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the Presidency from Washington to Bush (NY: Harper Collins, 1995), chapters 13 and 14 (Reagan and Bush)

Gates, Robert. In From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996)

Arbel, David and Ron Edelist, Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union 1980-1990 (London: Frank Cass, 2003)

Seliktar, Ofira. Politics, Paradigms and Intelligence Failures (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004)

Wk 12, Tuesday, Mar. 27:

Intelligence and 9/11

**** Major Essay Due ****

Required Reading:

9/11 Commission Report (Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States), July 2004, available online at www.9-11commission.gov/ Ch. 11 for an overall analysis, and chs. 12-13 for reform suggestions.

(Review) Gill and Pythian, Intelligence for an Insecure World, ch. 6

Secret Intelligence: A Reader, essay by Richard Betts, "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed," pp. 91-107

Secret Intelligence: A Reader, essay by Daniel Byman, “Strategic Surprise and the 9/11 attacks.” Pp. 164-185

Secret Intelligence: A Reader, essay by James J. Wirtz, “Déjà vu? Comparing Pearl Harbor and September 11,” pp. 186-192

Richard Betts, “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work this Time,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004

Richard A. Falkenrath, “The 9/11 Commission Report: A Review Essay,” International Security, 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 170-90

Richard A. Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent,” The New York Times Book Review, August 29, 2004, pp. 1, 9-11.

Suggested Reading:

Philip Shenon, The Commission: An Uncensored History of the 9/11 Commission (NY, 2009)

Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (NY: Knopf, 2006)

Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attack: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 (NY: Rowman and Littlefield/Hoover Institute, 2005)

Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (NY: Harper Collins, 2004), part II, “Intelligence Failure,” pp. 73-120

Wk 13, Tuesday, Apr. 3: Intelligence and the Origins of the Second Iraq War

Required Reading:

The US October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” [released by White House July 18, 2003] Available online at (official version):

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm

also at:

www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html

Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails (Cornell University Press, 2010), ch. 3 “The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure,” pp. 123-55.

Secret Intelligence: A Reader, essays by Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures,” and Richard J. Aldrich, “Intelligence and Iraq: the UK’s Four Enquiries,” pp. 193-244

Gill and Pythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, ch. 7

Lawrence Freedman, “War in Iraq: Selling the Threat,” Survival, 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004), 7-50

Paul Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Mar/April 2006

Kenneth M. Pollack, “Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong,” The Atlantic Monthly, 293, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 2004), pp. 79-92. Available online at: www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/pollack.htm

George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Remarks at Georgetown University, 5 February, 2004, available online at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/tenet_georgetown_speech_02052004.html

“Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community” [Kerr Group Report] 29 July 2004, On line at <http://cryptome.org/cia072904.htm>

Suggested reading:

Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,” International Security, 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 5-48

John Prados, Hood-Winked: The Documents that Reveal how Bush Sold Us a War (NY: New Press, 2004)

U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report of the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” July 2004. ** The most important review of US intelligence failures, but a massive document. Read selectively. Available online at <http://intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf>

George Packer, The Assassins Gate: America in Iraq (NY: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005), chs. 1-4

All Core requirements should be completed by the end of the junior year. Individual courses can meet a maximum of two Core Requirements. With the exception of the language proficiency requirement, Advanced Placement or International Baccalaureate examinations may not be used to satisfy any Core requirements. Transfer courses taken online may not be used to satisfy Core Requirements. CSP Seminars (8 units). The first-year CSP Seminars are the centerpiece of the Core Program. To obtain the Graduate Diploma in Community Economic Development (CED), a participant must obtain a minimum of 30 course credits and a minimum Grade Point Average of 2.70 or a B-. Courses offered within the Program range from required (3 credit) core courses, a required (6 credit) practical project course, (3-credit) elective Area of Concentration courses, to (1 credit). open session courses.Â Please note: For the definitive listing of course requirements and regulations, please refer to the Graduate Calendar. Course Requirements for the different categories of foundation classes.Â Course Requirements. Eternal Truths (14 Credits). Complete 1 requirement from each area: The Eternal Family: FDREL 200 â€” The Eternal Family (2 credits). Our other courses don't have particular subject requirements, although the Colleges will expect high grades in your subjects most relevant to the course youâ€™re applying for. Essential subject requirements are given on the Courses pages, and are defined as follows: all Colleges require â€” subjects that are essential for all Colleges. some Colleges require â€” subjects that are essential for some Colleges (see individual College websites for details).